OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders

ESET researchers analyzed a growing series of OilRig downloaders that the group has used in several campaigns throughout 2022, to maintain access to target organizations of special interest – all located in Israel. These lightweight downloaders, which we named SampleCheck5000 (SC5k v1-v3), OilCheck, ODAgent, and OilBooster, are notable for using one of several legitimate cloud service APIs for C&C communication and data exfiltration: the Microsoft Graph OneDrive or Outlook APIs, and the Microsoft Office Exchange Web Services (EWS) API.

In all cases, the downloaders use a shared (email or cloud storage) OilRig-operated account to exchange messages with the OilRig operators; the same account is typically shared by multiple victims. The downloaders access this account to download commands and additional payloads staged by the operators, and to upload command output and staged files.

We discovered the earliest of the series, SC5k (v1) downloader, in November 2021, when it was used in OilRig’s Outer Space campaign, documented in our recent blogpost. In the current blogpost, we focus on all of the SC5k successors that OilRig developed throughout 2022, with a new variation introduced every few months; we will also take a closer look at the mechanisms employed by these downloaders. We also compare these downloaders to other OilRig backdoors that use email-based C&C protocols, and that were reported earlier this year by Trend Micro (MrPerfectionManager) and Symantec (PowerExchange).

Finally, this blogpost also expands on our LABScon 2023 presentation, where we drilled down into how OilRig keeps access to selected Israeli organizations: all of the downloaders studied in this blogpost were deployed in networks that were previously affected by multiple OilRig tools, which underlines the fact that OilRig is persistent in targeting the same organizations, and determined to keep its foothold in compromised networks.

Key points of this blogpost:

• OilRig actively developed and used a series of downloaders with a similar logic throughout 2022: three new downloaders – ODAgent, OilCheck, OilBooster – and newer versions of the SC5k downloader.
• The downloaders use various legitimate cloud service APIs for C&C communication and data exfiltration: Microsoft Graph OneDrive API, Microsoft Graph Outlook API, and Microsoft Office EWS API.
• Targets, all in Israel, included an organization in the healthcare sector, a manufacturing company, a local governmental organization, and other organizations.
• All targets were previously affected by multiple OilRig campaigns.

Attribution

OilRig, also known as APT34, Lyceum, Crambus, or Siamesekitten, is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014 and is commonly believed to be based in Iran. The group targets Middle Eastern governments and a variety of business verticals, including chemical, energy, financial, and telecommunications.

OilRig carried out the DNSpionage campaign in 2018 and 2019, which targeted victims in Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. In 2019 and 2020, OilRig continued its attacks with the HardPass campaign, which used LinkedIn to target Middle Eastern victims in the energy and government sectors. In 2021, OilRig updated its DanBot backdoor and began deploying the Shark, Milan, and Marlin backdoors, as mentioned in the T3 2021 issue of the ESET Threat Report. In 2022 and 2023, the group carried out several attacks against local government entities and healthcare organizations in Israel, using its new backdoors Solar and Mango. In 2023, OilRig targeted organizations in the Middle East with the PowerExchange and MrPerfectionManager backdoors, and related tools to harvest internal mailbox account credentials and then to leverage these accounts for exfiltration.

We attribute SC5k (v1-v3), ODAgent, OilCheck, and OilBooster downloaders to OilRig with a high level of confidence, based on these indicators:

• Targets:
  • These downloaders were deployed exclusively against Israeli organizations, which aligns with typical OilRig targeting.
  • The observed verticals of the victims also align with OilRig’s interests – for example, we have seen OilRig previously targeting the Israeli healthcare sector, as well as the local government sector in Israel.
• Code similarities:
  • The SC5k v2 and v3 downloaders evolved naturally from the initial version, which was previously used in an OilRig Outer Space campaign. ODAgent, OilCheck and OilBooster share similar logic, and all use various cloud service providers for their C&C communications, as do SC5k, Marlin, PowerExchange, and MrPerfectionManager.
  • While not unique to OilRig, these downloaders have a low level of sophistication and are often unnecessarily noisy on the system, which is a practice we previously observed in its Out to Sea campaign.

Overview

In February 2022, we detected a new OilRig downloader, which we named ODAgent based on its filename: ODAgent.exe. ODAgent is a C#/.NET downloader that, similar to OilRig’s Marlin backdoor, uses the Microsoft OneDrive API for C&C communications. Unlike Marlin, which supports a comprehensive list of backdoor commands, ODAgent’s narrow capabilities are limited to downloading and executing payloads, and to exfiltrating staged files.

ODAgent was detected in the network of a manufacturing company in Israel – interestingly, the same organization was previously affected by OilRig’s SC5k downloader, and later by another new downloader, OilCheck, between April and June 2022. SC5k and OilCheck have similar capabilities to ODAgent, but use cloud-based email services for their C&C communications.

Throughout 2022, we observed the same pattern being repeated on multiple occasions, with new downloaders being deployed in the networks of previous OilRig targets: for example, between June and August 2022, we detected the OilBooster, SC5k v1, and SC5k v2 downloaders and the Shark backdoor, all in the network of a local governmental organization in Israel. Later we detected yet another SC5k version (v3), in the network of an Israeli healthcare organization, also a previous OilRig victim.

SC5k is a C#/.NET application whose purpose is to download and execute additional OilRig tools using the Office Exchange Web Services (EWS) API. The new versions introduced changes to make retrieval and analysis of the malicious payloads harder for analysts (SC5k v2), and new exfiltration functionality (SC5k v3).

All the downloaders, summarized in Figure 1, share a similar logic but have different implementations and show growing complexity over time, alternating C#/.NET binaries with C/C++ applications, varying the cloud service providers misused for the C&C communication, and other specifics.

OilRig has only used these downloaders against a limited number of targets, all located in Israel and, according to ESET telemetry, all of them were persistently targeted months earlier by other OilRig tools. As it is common for organizations to access Office 365 resources, OilRig’s cloud service-powered downloaders can thus blend more easily into the regular stream of network traffic – apparently also the reason why the attackers chose to deploy these downloaders to a small group of especially interesting, repeatedly victimized targets.

As of this writing, the following (exclusively Israeli, as noted above) organizations were affected:

• a manufacturing company (SC5k v1, ODAgent, and OilCheck),
• a local governmental organization (SC5k v1, OilBooster, and SC5k v2),
• a healthcare organization (SC5k v3), and
• other unidentified organizations in Israel (SC5k v1).

Unfortunately, we don’t have information about the initial attack vector used to compromise the targets discussed in this blogpost – we can’t confirm whether the attackers have been able to successfully compromise the same organizations repeatedly, or if they somehow managed to keep their foothold in the network in between deploying various tools.

Technical analysis

Table 1. A summary of main characteristics of OilRig’s downloaders abusing legitimate cloud service providers

SC5k downloader

The SampleCheck5000 (or SC5k) downloader is a C#/.NET application, and the first in a series of OilRig’s lightweight downloaders that use legitimate cloud services for their C&C communication. We briefly documented the first variant in our recent blogpost, and have since discovered two newer variants.

All SC5k variants use the Microsoft Office EWS API to interact with a shared Exchange mail account, as a way to download additional payloads and commands, and to upload data. Email drafts and their attachments are the primary vehicle for the C&C traffic in all the versions of this downloader, but the later versions increase the complexity of this C&C protocol (SC5k v3) and add detection evasion capabilities (SC5k v2). This section focuses on highlighting these differences.

Exchange account used for C&C communication

At runtime, SC5k connects to a remote Exchange server via the EWS API to obtain additional payloads and commands to execute from an email account shared with the attacker (and usually other victims). By default, a Microsoft Office 365 Outlook account is accessed via the https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx URL using hardcoded credentials, but some SC5k versions also have the capability to connect to other remote Exchange servers when a configuration file is present with a hardcoded name (setting.key, set.idl) and the corresponding credentials inside.

We have seen the following email addresses used by SC5k versions for C&C communication, the first of which gave the downloader its name:

• samplecheck5000@outlook.com
• FrancesLPierce@outlook.com
• SandraRCharles@outlook.com

In SC5k v2, the default Microsoft Exchange URL, email address, and password are not included in the main module – instead, the downloader’s code has been split into multiple modules. We have detected only variations of the main application, which logs into a remote Exchange server, iterates through emails in the Drafts directory, and extracts additional payloads from their attachments. However, this application depends on two external classes that were not present in the detected samples and are probably implemented in the missing module(s):

• The class init should provide an interface to obtain the email address, username, and password required to log into the remote Exchange account, and other configuration values from the other module.
• The class structure should implement functions used for encryption, compression, executing downloaded payloads, and other helper functions.

These changes were likely introduced to make retrieval and analysis of the malicious payloads harder for analysts, as the two missing classes are crucial for identifying the Exchange account used for malware distribution.

C&C and exfiltration protocol

In all versions, the SC5k downloader repeatedly logs into a remote Exchange server using the ExchangeService .NET class in the Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data namespace to interact with the EWS API. Once connected, SC5k reads email messages with attachments in the Drafts directory to extract attacker commands and additional payloads. Conversely, in each connection, SC5k exfiltrates files from a local staging directory by creating new email drafts in the same email account. The path to the staging directory varies across samples.

Of interest is the way both the operators and various instances of this downloader can distinguish between the different types of drafts in the shared email account. For one, each email draft has a <victimID> incorporated, which allows the same Exchange account to be used for multiple OilRig victims:

• For v1 and v2, the downloader transmits the <victimID> as a custom attribute of the email draft via the SetExtendedProperty method.
• For v3, the downloader incorporates the <victimID> into the From field of the email draft.

The <victimID> is typically generated using the compromised system’s information, such as the system volume ID or the computer name, as shown in Figure 2.

Furthermore, various email properties can be used to distinguish between messages created by the operators (commands, additional payloads) and messages created by the malware instances (command outputs, exfiltrated files). SC5k v1 and v2 use file extensions (of the draft attachments) to make that distinction, while SC5k v3 uses the From and MailItem.Categories fields of the email draft to distinguish between various actions. At each point, the email drafts in the shared email account can serve various purposes, as summarized in Table 2 and explained below. Note that the email addresses used in the From field are not genuine; because SC5k never sends out any actual email messages, these attributes are only used to distinguish between different malicious actions.

Table 2. Types of email messages used by SC5k v3 for C&C communications

More specifically, SC5k v3 processes (and then deletes) those email messages from the shared Exchange account that have the From field set to <victimID>@outlook.com, and distinguishes between commands and additional payloads by the message category (MailItem.Categories):

• For payloads, the attached file is XOR decrypted using the hardcoded key &5z, then gzip decompressed and dumped in the working directory.
• For shell commands, the draft attachment is base64 decoded, XOR decrypted, and then executed locally using cmd.exe or, in the case of SC5k v3, using a custom command interpreter located under the name <baseDirectory>\*Ext.dll. This file is then loaded via Assembly.LoadFrom, and its extend method invoked with the command passed as an argument.

To communicate with the attackers, SC5k v3 creates draft messages with a different From field: <victimID>@aol.com. Attached to these messages are outputs of previously received commands, or contents of the local staging directory. Files are always gzip compressed and XOR encrypted before being uploaded to the shared mailbox, while shell commands and command outputs are XOR encrypted and base64 encoded.

Finally, SC5k v3 repeatedly creates a new draft on the shared Exchange account with the From field set to <victimID>@yahoo.com, to indicate to the attackers that this downloader instance is still active. This keep-alive message, whose construction is shown in Figure 3, has no attachment and is renewed with each connection to the remote Exchange server.

Other OilRig tools using email-based C&C protocol

OilCheck, a C#/.NET downloader discovered in April 2022, also uses draft messages created in a shared email account for both directions of the C&C communication. Unlike SC5k, OilCheck uses the REST-based Microsoft Graph API to access a shared Microsoft Office 365 Outlook email account, not the SOAP-based Microsoft Office EWS API. While SC5k uses the built-in ExchangeService .NET class to create the API requests transparently, OilCheck builds the API requests manually. The main characteristics of OilCheck are summarized in Table 1 above.

Earlier in 2023, two other OilRig backdoors were publicly documented: MrPerfectionManager (Trend Micro, February 2023) and PowerExchange (Symantec, October 2023), both using email-based C&C protocols to exfiltrate data. A notable difference between these tools and OilRig’s downloaders studied in this blogpost is that the former use the victimized organization’s Exchange server to transmit email messages from and to the attacker’s email account. In contrast: with SC5k and OilCheck, both the malware and the operator accessed the same Exchange account and communicated by creating email drafts, never sending an actual message.

In any case, the new findings confirm the trend of OilRig shifting away from the previously used HTTP/DNS-based protocols to using legitimate cloud service providers as a way to hide its malicious communication and to mask the group’s network infrastructure, while still experimenting with various flavors of such alternative protocols.

OilBooster downloader

OilBooster is a 64-bit portable executable (PE) written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ with statically linked OpenSSL and Boost libraries (hence the name). Like OilCheck, it uses the Microsoft Graph API to connect to a Microsoft Office 365 account. Unlike OilCheck, it uses this API to interact with a OneDrive (not Outlook) account controlled by the attackers for C&C communication and exfiltration. OilBooster can download files from the remote server, execute files and shell commands, and exfiltrate the results.

Overview

Upon execution, OilBooster hides its console window (via the ShowWindow API) and verifies that it was executed with a command line argument; otherwise it terminates immediately.

OilBooster then builds a <victimID> by combining the compromised computer’s hostname and username: <hostname>-<username>. This identifier is later used in the C&C communication: OilBooster creates a specific subdirectory on the shared OneDrive account for each victim, which is then used to store backdoor commands and additional payloads (uploaded by the operators), command results, and exfiltrated data (uploaded by the malware). This way, the same OneDrive account can be shared by multiple victims.

Figure 4 shows the structure of the shared OneDrive account and the local working directory, and summarizes the C&C protocol.

As shown in Figure 4, the OilRig operator uploads backdoor commands and additional payloads to the victim-specific directory on OneDrive, as files with the .doc and .docx extensions, respectively. On the other end of the C&C protocol, OilBooster uploads command results and exfiltrated data as files with the .xls and .xlsx extensions, respectively. Note that these are not genuine Microsoft Office files, but rather JSON files with XOR-encrypted and base64-encoded values.

Figure 5 shows OilBooster spawning instances of two threads in an indefinite loop, sleeping for 153,123 milliseconds after each iteration:

Both threads interact with the shared OneDrive account:

1. A downloader thread handles C&C communication and executes downloaded payloads.
2. An exfiltration thread exfiltrates data from the local staging directory.

The downloader thread connects to the attacker-controlled OneDrive account and iterates through all files with the .doc and .docx extensions, which are then downloaded, decrypted, and parsed in order to extract and execute additional payloads on the compromised host. A local subdirectory named items in the current working directory (where OilBooster is deployed) is used to store the downloaded files. As shown in Figure 6, each connection attempt is handled in a separate thread instance, launched once every 53,123 milliseconds.

The exfiltration thread iterates over another local subdirectory, named tempFiles, and exfiltrates its contents to the shared OneDrive account, which are uploaded there as individual files with the .xlsx extension. The staging directory is cleared this way once every 43,123 milliseconds in a separate thread instance, as also seen in Figure 6.

Network communication

For C&C communication and exfiltration, OilBooster uses the Microsoft Graph API to access the shared OneDrive account, using a variety of HTTP GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE requests to the graph.microsoft.com host over the standard 443 port. For brevity, we will also refer to these requests as OneDrive API requests. The encrypted communication is facilitated by the statically linked OpenSSL library, which handles the SSL communication.

To authenticate with the OneDrive account, OilBooster first obtains the OAuth2 access token from the Microsoft identity platform (the authorization server) by sending a POST request with the following body over port 443 to login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/token, using hardcoded credentials:

client_id=860b23a7-d484-481d-9fea-d3e6e129e249
&redirect_uri=https://login.live.com/oauth20_desktop.srf
&client_secret=<redacted>
&refresh_token=<redacted>
&grant_type=refresh_token

OilBooster obtains a new access token this way, which will be used in the Authorization header of the subsequent OneDrive API requests, along with a new refresh token. OilBooster also has a backup channel to request a new refresh token from its C&C server after 10 consecutive unsuccessful connections to the OneDrive server. As shown in Figure 7, the new token can be acquired by sending a simple HTTP GET request on port 80 to host1[.]com/rt.ovf (a legitimate, likely compromised website), which should be followed by the new refresh token in cleartext in the HTTP response.

The various network connections made by OilBooster are summarized in Figure 8.

Downloader loop

In the downloader loop, OilBooster repeatedly connects to the shared OneDrive account to obtain a list of files with the .docx and .doc extensions in the victim-specific subdirectory named <victimID>/items/ by sending an HTTP GET request over port 443 to this URL:

graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/<victimID>/items:/children?$filter=endsWith(name,’.doc’)%20or%20endsWith(name,’.docx’)&$select=id,name,file

If the connection is not successful (the HTTP_STATUS_DENIED response status) after 10 attempts, OilBooster connects to its fallback C&C server, host1[.]com/rt.ovf, to acquire a new refresh token, as discussed earlier.

Alternatively, if the specified directory does not yet exist (HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND), OilBooster first registers the victim on the shared OneDrive account by sending an HTTP POST request over port 443 to this URL: graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/items/root:/<victimID>:/children with the JSON string {“name”: “items”,”folder”:{}} as the request body, as shown in Figure 9. This request creates the whole directory structure <victimID>/items at the same time, which will later be used by the attackers to store commands and additional payloads disguised as .doc and .docx files.

On subsequent connections (with HTTP_STATUS_OK), OilBooster processes these files to extract and execute payloads. OilBooster first downloads each file from the OneDrive account and deletes it from OneDrive after processing the file.

Processing .docx files

Note the unnecessary creation of several files in the process – this is typical for OilRig. We previously described the group’s noisy operations on compromised hosts in its Out to Sea campaign.

Exfiltration loop

In the exfiltration thread, OilBooster loops over the contents of the local directory named <currentdir>\tempFiles, and uploads the file contents to the victim’s folder on the shared OneDrive account. Each file is processed in this way:

• OilBooster gzip compresses the original file <filename>.<original extension> and writes the result to a file named <filename>.<original extension>.xlsx in the same directory.
• It then encrypts the compressed file using an XOR cipher and .<original extension> as the key. If there is no file extension, 4cx is used as the default key.

Finally, the encrypted file is uploaded to the OneDrive account, and the local file is deleted.

ODAgent downloader: OilBooster’s precursor

ODAgent is a C#/.NET application that uses the Microsoft Graph API to access an attacker-controlled OneDrive account for C&C communication and exfiltration – in short, ODAgent is loosely a C#/.NET precursor of OilBooster. Similar to OilBooster, ODAgent repeatedly connects to the shared OneDrive account and lists the contents of the victim-specific folder to obtain additional payloads and backdoor commands.

As shown in Figure 10, ODAgent then parses the metadata for each remote file. Subsequently, it uses the value of the mimeType key associated with the file to distinguish between backdoor commands (formatted as JSON files) and encrypted payloads – this is unlike OilBooster, which uses file extensions for that distinction. After processing a file locally, ODAgent deletes the original from the remote OneDrive directory via the OneDrive API.

If the downloaded file is a JSON file, ODAgent parses the a1 (command ID), a2 (encrypted backdoor command) and a3 (secret) arguments. It first derives the session key by XORing the provided secret with the hardcoded value 15a49w@]. Then, it base64 decodes and XOR decrypts the backdoor command using this session key. Table 3 lists all backdoor commands supported by ODAgent.

Table 3. Backdoor commands supported by ODAgent

Backdoor command	Description
odt>	Returns the path to the current working directory.
dly><delaytime>	Configures the number of seconds to wait after each connection to <delaytime>.
<commandline>	Executes the specified <commandline> via the native API and returns the command output.

Other (non-JSON) files downloaded from the shared OneDrive account are files and additional payloads, both encrypted. ODAgent XOR decrypts these files with the hardcoded key 15a49w@], and drops them in the local <currentdir>\o directory under the same filename. If the original file has a .c extension, its content is also gzip decompressed (and the extension is then dropped from the filename).

At the end of each connection, ODAgent uploads the contents of the local directory <currentdir>\i to the <victimID>/i directory on the shared OneDrive account, preserving the original filenames with the added .c extension.

Conclusion

For any inquiries about our research published on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com.
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IoCs

Files

Network

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

This table was built using version 14 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.